Investigating History and Making History

Learning Histories in Learning and Change Projects
Making History with a Passion

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INTRODUCTION

The learning histories method makes ideas about organisational learning practical. The method helps to make a memory in times of renewal, can elicit learning, stimulate, but also block learning. The question is how to achieve success as a professional or manager with this method. To that end we investigate experiences with this method. We begin by discussing the method in its original form and then move on to three case studies from the Netherlands. We examine the course of the proceedings, the results and effects. We continue with a discussion that we hope will elicit reflective dialogues with other users about the who, what and how of the method. In conclusion, we show where we have got to in our discussion. We pay particular attention to the relationship between power and learning.

1. LEARNING HISTORIES

> *Call in mind a group of people sitting around a camp fire, each with his or her own piece of the narrative to offer . . .*
>
> (Roth & Kleiner, 2000b)

The idea of organisational learning points out that not only people at the top but many others at various other levels in organisations work on revitalisation, improvement and renewal. Roth and Kleiner (MIT; Society of Organisational Learning) developed a method based on this idea: learning histories. Their assumption is that many people work on renewal, but that we rarely organise the collective memory. The consequence is that good discoveries resulting from trial-and-error learning gradually disappear. To tackle this loss of memory Roth and Kleiner propose writing 'learning histories', or organising deeper or

investigative learning processes.[1] How does this work? In businesses organisations people form a 'research team' to 'reconstruct' particular projects, situations or episodes from very recent history, so that we can learn something from them. An external consultant is added to the research team to create some distance and prevent blind spots. The team asks everyone involved what the *discernible results* are and who, what and which method of working ensured that it was a success. The team lists the results and presents them to new discussion partners. They can choose what they want to talk about and add results themselves. The team mainly asks questions like: 'What was happening then? What did you see, what did you feel?' The conversations are worked up meticulously. The outsiders distil themes from the material. The team then constructs a *jointly told tale* and a representation is compiled in columns. The 'large' column contains a story as it might be told around a campfire, with different people contributing bits and pieces. The narrow column contains the reflection of the researchers with a rationale for the choice of quotes. Separate boxes provide space for elaboration. It is important that the chain of 'results', actions, strategies and the underlying convictions comes into the picture from different perspectives.

Letting the various people concerned have a say is called *multi-voicing*. This principle ensures that the story is not boxed in, but reflects the perspectives of the various actors involved and stays close to emotions. The patterns of innovation or change are revealed. Roth and Kleiner made a detailed workbook. They put part of it on the internet, freely downloadable, and that whets the appetite. One of their pictures conveys clearly what they believe is involved in making a learning history (see Figure 5.1).

Wonderful histories have emerged with this method, for instance about the oil industry (Roth & Kleiner, 2000a) and the car industry (Roth & Kleiner, 2000b). The authors see the product (the *history*) as a transitional object, an aid that should elicit reflective conversations elsewhere in the organisation. This is possible through validation

Figure 5.1   (Figure by Art Kleiner, adapted by Tonnie van der Zouwen)

workshops, readers' workshops and team meetings. It works bests if the dissemination of the product is openly defended by senior management. The authors emphasise that the quotations in the learning history must be rigorously validated and made anonymous. They recommend adding a reading guide to the product, so that the text is not read in a standard way.

Their method therefore works towards a written story in retrospect, each time with verbatim texts from conversations. This story is then given back to the organisation. A 'feedback loop' is made in this way, directed at making decisions and/or further eliciting discussions and giving meaning.

However, if we accept the view that people in organisations are already making history in the here-and-now,[2] research is working on *real-time* data. You can no longer distinguish *sense-taking* from *sense-making*. In that case the method is being used more for working on a 'feedforward loop',[3] aimed at designing or developing futures! Here too the considerations of Roth and Kleiner in *The Field Manual for the Learning Historian* can be the starting point, although it does start to cause friction. We have found this in our working practice. For that reason we organised a conversation to construct principles to develop the method further.

2. LEARNING HISTORY IN PRACTICE IN THE NETHERLANDS

The method has been used in the Netherlands in a number of places, including Unilever (Mirvis, Ayas & Roth, 2001; 2003), in a chain of stores (Halbertsma, 2006), at the Dutch Railways NS UWV [Employee Insurance Schemes Implementing Body] (Busato, 2006), in a government department, in development aid organisations and in Sioo learning groups. The experiences are positive, but throw up questions too. Here we will discuss three cases that we have good access to: 1) where an external consultant acts as leading researcher, 2) where an external consultant helps an internal player, and 3) where a manager is *in the lead* and is helped by a researcher. In each case we indicate what it is about (*results*), what historians do (*progress of the process*), what comes out of it (*output*) and where that leads to (*outcome*).

Case Study 1. Feedback loop in a chain of stores[4]

I constructed learning histories for a chain of stores. It was an evaluation investigation into a management development (MD) project among senior management. The aim of the project was to make managers more enterprising and energetic and get them coaching more. We used the learning history to evaluate what it yielded for the participants and the organisation. We learned that this evaluation approach is another learning intervention in itself: the (ex)participants thought it was fantastic to get another look at the modules they had followed! And the managers, who initially felt uncomfortable due to unfamiliarity during the course, became involved.

I made a learning history for three divisions. For each division we organised meetings with all participants at which their stories were discussed. At that point they heard each other's stories for the first time and shared them with each other. Subsequently, there were meetings with members of the board, participants as well as their managers.

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A collective reflection and language arose; people spoke effectively about the results of the course, considered the results and discussed the learning experiences with each other. The organisation seemed to be talking with itself, in a structured and safe way.

This resulted in follow-up discussions, and on the basis of those discussions we made a number of modifications to the course, such as:

- more practice time for converting the insights gained into action;
- better communication between the managers and their participants beforehand, during and after the course;
- exercising at the end of every module with: 'What am I going to tell my boss?', or learning how to say something in a less secure environment about matters that affect them personally.

In addition, the divisions are working on linking the course with their own organisations.

I did this assignment with two internal people. I led the investigation, an absorbing and instructive experience from which I gained a lot. I am very satisfied with how I managed everything, except for the last phase, the transfer of the final learning history to the organisation. I don't feel I was able to guarantee it in every operating company. It was as if upper management had no idea what to do with it. This was especially obvious in an operating company where the participants were critical about the lack of support from their managers. We should have talked to them more about that, but didn't.

In case 1 the consultant wants to organise feedback through a learning history, and this results in proposals for improving the course. But while quite a lot could be improved precisely in the environment of the course, outside the circle of the professionals (consultant, HRD people), to make the course more profitable, the employing authority itself (the board of management) lacks the motivation to do so. This had to do with not appreciating the urgency to the extent that one wanted to get out and tackle it. A decision was made to leave things be. The other stakeholders (researchers, participants) did not have enough power to effect any change. The result is that what was learned has not been used. This theme of low utilisation due to lack of commitment from management also emerges in the American examples. Roth and Kleiner even say that you should only start on diffusion (disseminating the product with an eye to utilisation) if you involve senior management explicitly, for example by getting them to write a preface. If not: don't even start. This seems to be a paradox: learning appears to depend on power.

Case Study 2. Digging deep in a department[5]

A department has been wrestling for a long time with the contracts administration. Justifying spending is becoming problematic. It looks like supplementary regulations are needed. Before the review, people want to learn from the past. A friend of mine, L., is given the job. He has worked for 40 years in this organisation, and has now set up on his own. He was involved in the design and implementation of the regulations

as head of contracts for a regional board. Whoever has anything to do with contracts in the department, knows L. He is seen as unique: he speaks the language of the technicians, that of the lawyers and that of the supervisors, the 'boys from implementation'. His project 'Historical research into lawfulness projects' covers a period of 15 years and includes all kinds of factors, focusing on the relationships between them. L. asks me to participate as an external consultant because of my experience in research and change methods. We collect stories via retrospective, open interviews with 15 key persons from inside and outside. We perform an extensive dossier investigation, look for artefacts and make a diary with our own observations and reflections. From that mountain of information we distil meaningful connections, statements and stories and note them down in a double-column document. Crucial factors emerge. We are not looking for judgements, but for driving forces and patterns in accounting for rightfulness. We make causal loop diagrams (CLDs) and flow diagrams.

We present the learning history as a slide presentation with the patterns and conclusions, illustrated with quotations and figures. To provide foundations for the whole we give a double-column story of 31 pages and a list of our observations from the research into the dossiers.

In a meeting with the key persons and sponsors we check the results and conclusions for recognisability, completeness and support. We receive a lot of praise for the thoroughness of the investigation. Every slide is considered in-depth; it's very time-consuming. It is mainly about the right use of language – understandable as a parliamentary inquiry has been declared. After approval, the slide presentation is used in discussions about the administrative justification with different management teams from regional managements.

The presentation, especially the diagrams and quotations, make the people present conscious of a deeply rooted logic in the organisation: 'If the implementation of rules leaves something to be desired, then we must try to solve that through new or supplementary rules.' Experimenting with a different approach is not encouraged. One project leader calls this the baby walker effect: 'You are only allowed out of the baby walker once you can walk; otherwise you might fall.' A delay effect also comes to the fore: regulations are not given the time to 'ground'; after an incident more rules are brought in immediately.

This discussion results in a drastic modification of the plans for the reorganisation of the financial administration. New regulations weren't introduced. One supervisor said: 'New regulations will not improve the practice and we don't know the current rules, so just leave us alone.' The dissemination of the insights remained limited to a relatively small part of the organisation.

We did not use the term 'learning history', but 'historical research'. Those words are more acceptable in this organisation. L.'s being well known meant there was no problem with access to information and cooperation. The commitment and enthusiasm of the people was striking. The interviews delivered a large diversity of absorbing stories. The number of persons involved was relatively small and the dissemination of the learning history depends to a large extent on one person. The political sensitivity of the subject contributed to the limited distribution. After all, you can easily misuse a learning history by taking statements out of context. Thorough foundation and validation of the learning history by the people involved are important, otherwise there is a risk that a possibly compromising outcome will be scrapped in advance.

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> In this approach I combined learning history with systems thinking and document investigation, stories and illustrations alongside making CLDs and fact-finding. The complexity in the relationship of factors has emerged well, likewise fields of tensions between 'family feeling' and 'communicating in a businesslike fashion with each other, getting even with each other' and between 'technical engineer-thinking' and 'daring to make mistakes'.

In this second case an 'old hand' works with an external consultant to reveal entrenched patterns in working methods. Together they make a 'reflection' whereby the reconstructed patterns are very accurate and result in recognition. In that sense this approach makes the organisation more reflective. The mirror leads to behaviour being stopped. In that sense using the method results in learning. But this learning remains limited to a small group due to fear of negative publicity. The dissemination never really gets going for that reason. That means that many possible learning gains are not made. The researcher (the old hand) is notable. He used to be active himself in this area. But he has left the department and no longer has no interest in it. The advantage of that is that nobody can pull one over him or play games with him in any way. Otherwise that could result in distortion of the investigation. Collaboration with an outsider is supposed to prevent this from happening.

As with Roth and Kleiner's approach, a lot of attention was paid to validation. This makes sense, given the political sensitivity of the topic. At the same time this sensitivity is the reason for putting the diffusion on the backburner.

> **Case Study 3. Large-scale lay-offs without negative fall-out**[6]
>
> A manager, M., has to phase out one of the three divisions at a semi state-controlled organisation, UWV. The new organisation only has jobs for one out of three employees. Lay-offs are unavoidable, including in management. Even his own job is at stake. He sets up a change organisation so that the phasing-out will not proceed in the classic, controlled way by declaring jobs surplus to requirements and possibly forced redundancies. He wanted to tackle the reorganisation in a radically different way. He also wants to give an account of that approach in a book, written by an independent author.
>
> He encouraged employees to become mobile, show initiative themselves and take their future into their own hands. This is a paradigm shift. In this organisation the employees are loyal and identify with the goal: supporting people in trouble. In exchange for that loyalty, they get continuity and job security. M. made a communication approach aimed at the mobility aspect. The employees have to learn new ideas step by step. Middle management plays a key role here; they encourage employees to become mobile and they have to become mobile themselves and monitor the going concern. This is not simple, as middle managers are used to steering by control according to performance indicators.
>
> He started a dialogue among all the employees and managers. He had a theatre production made to get that dialogue rolling. The board was initially against it. According to the change agents, they were unwilling to take on the confrontation with large groups

of people and afraid of the pent-up emotions that this would release. But that emotional confrontation is precisely what the change agents wanted.

The performance has two main archetypes: William and Marlene. William is unconditionally loyal and won't get moving, in the firm belief that they can't afford to manage without him. Marlene is full of initiative, enterprising, doesn't throw in the towel, is loyal to herself, an employee of the future.

Managers can talk to their employees by saying 'you're a lot like William', or 'you resemble Marlene more and more'.

At every theatre performance M. was on stage to tell the people what they could expect. He experienced there how violent emotions can be. 'That had such an impact on me. What affected me so much at that time was that it got through to me abundantly that those people's lives would change fundamentally. Their pain was my pain. I see that as a fundamental choice of leadership: not leading someone, but leading with someone.' The approach was successful: a good 900 members of UWV staff left of their own accord, without claiming unemployment benefit. In total no more than 100 people were made redundant.

There was an atmosphere of conflict around the approach. M.: 'It was difficult, but I am convinced that this is the way to tackle this kind of restructuring process.' In two other divisions the manager used the controlled approach to achieve a very large reduction. The managers could not agree. M. was not always able to explain his conviction properly.

'If I feel intuitively that something is right, I am not always able to express . . . that rationally. . . . And then if I get rational counterarguments, I am defenceless, I get angry. But my message doesn't get any clearer for all that.'

What was the researcher's approach? He had three weeks to orient himself and then he came up with a research proposal. He interviewed M. and his colleagues about five times and spoke with a good 50 people from all levels in the organisation and about 15 externally involved persons. These were very open conversations. He is quite resigned in his account. The book was written between March 2005 and January 2006. Finally, he asked experts in the field of change management for a reflection. One of them delivered this judgement: 'Whoever succeeds in the public domain to move more than nine hundred employees to leave voluntarily and forgo (financial) arrangements from a redundancy package, has delivered an exceptional performance, including in terms of costs.'

In this third case, a passionate manager[7] produces a novel work method for reorganisations and dismissal with his colleagues. What is remarkable is the use of communication and theatre. Archetypes are created that elicit the formation of stories. One archetype stands for the future, for the desired *noticeable outcome*. This approach has its tensions and conflicts and he battles them out. He wants to set down the work method (or get it set down) for the outside world, but also because the process is still well under way and he wants to buck people up. So here, bringing the learning history back into the system has been conceived as a feedforward intervention. He wants to prevent the people from falling back into the paradigm of loyalty and continuity and contribute to them moving, even when he is no longer available himself as manager.

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3. REFLECTION

Learning history gives legs to deep organisational learning. It is an improvement when compared with descriptions of cases or of *best practices* that are situated closer to truth-finding and judgements. The method can be used to map out very specific capabilities that an organisation evidently has, but does not always actually understand. You get further than the point of understanding successes as the result of chance or the coincidence of people and circumstances. By putting 'multi-voices' first, the method builds further on the practice of telling stories in organisations as one of the ways employees and managers pass on wisdom to each other (see Orr, 1996; Narduzzo, Rocco & Warglien, 2000), more or less separately from formal stories from professional and policy circuits. The method shows that learning and change are co-constructive practices. It is important to revert to the 'in those days', because it restores[8] a sense of continuity for people and, moreover, takes people (temporarily) out of the mode of *agency* (Weick, 2001).

But what are the sticking points in the method that determine whether a manager or professional will have any success with it? In reflecting on the cases we examine the 'who', the 'what' (result or product), the 'how' (process) and the research technique.

Who: The Professional and Political Perspective

In all cases a professional and more political perspective is operating. Within the professional perspective the 'research mode' of the external consultant or researcher dominates. This is about doing 'smart' research. Production dominates: the story (text) must be finished and delivered. In this perspective, managers' unrest appears impossible or difficult to influence. Managers quickly see the risk with the method: learning history can raise issues that people at the top don't particularly want to hear, or people outside are very keen to hear, which can lead to major problems. So they do allow the learning history to be used, but the dissemination is put on the backburner. This can result in the researcher leaving once he has finished the product. And this blocks the path of deep or investigative learning that was started. The organisation switches back to a lower level of tension and a comfort zone with less deep or less conscious forms of learning. The professional perspective can therefore obstruct deep learning.

If a more political perspective dominates, the tensions are not avoided. For example: in case 3 the manager has to defend creating a dialogue about the phasing-out against the resistance of the board of directors; he has to protect the approach from a more technocratic approach. What is striking here is the space that emotions are given; more aspects of learning than the cognitive ones get a look-in here. Handling that properly requires a change organisation from which the learning processes are monitored and extra actions are started. Process steering and *real-time* sense-making are brought to the fore. What one constructs in the organisation can be called a *conversation room* (Pask, 1975), or a space for exploration, meta-dialogue and deep learning. That also means that it is better if we talk about 'pacesetters' for the 'who' rather than about *historians* or researchers. Instead of the consultant or manager being a 'voyeur', he assumes a position as a player, instead of registrar he is a *régisseur*; now it is not only about understanding the history but precisely about making history.

What: Products and Transitional Objects

The cases put making a 'report' into perspective. A report can make the process get stuck, prevent the production of stories going *automatically*. To that end Roth and Kleiner recommend composing the report in a set format, with text in columns. By writing it that way, *reading* the history becomes a process of co-construction.

> 'This approach is not without cost. You cannot read through the learning history the way you can read through a case because you do not have the single analytical thread the case writer provides. Instead, you are battered by many voices, many of which disagree with each other or at least present orthogonal points of view. I find the format both interesting and irritating . . .' (Schein, in Roth & Kleiner, 2000a, p. 191)

The column structure is an interesting device, but it is a solution within one type of object. The core of the method is not making a report, but creating dialogues that result in actions. A report can play a part in that, but it is not the main aim. Like Roth and Kleiner we consider a report to be a transitional object that you make to draw out reflective dialogues (Roth & Kleiner, 2000b). However, we believe that professionals or managers who want to make a feedforward loop have to determine for each situation what a suitable transitional object is. On one occasion a text is better suited to the purpose, on another a PowerPoint presentation or other form of representation (see Morgan, 1993), and yet another time a theatre production with archetypes will be better, with one archetype standing for the desired *noticeable result*. The point is keeping the storytellers in the game for as long as possible, or realising that other storytellers keep getting involved. The story must not be separated from the storyteller (see Benjamin, 1980).

Process: The Social Organisation of the Dialogue

As with Roth and Kleiner we see a tendency in the cases to work in small groups on one dialogue. The small group offers safety; that also makes the potential emotional clashes controllable. Although this seems persuasive, it also has the effect that learning remains limited and does not fan out. Then again, we see that with something like a theatre performance in case 3 with the manager on the soapbox it gets very fierce. That puts off a lot of people, but you do reach many more as a result. And isn't that the intention? This kind of strong intervention to encourage deep learning requires a thorough reflection beforehand about the question of who is intervening, what that arouses in other people and what you will do with the reaction. As a pacesetter you need well-developed competencies.

Research Technique

What is special in these cases is that the researchers don't work with interviews or standardised questionnaires. The interview was invented as an interrogation technique to get at the truth. Questionnaires are a type of standardised interview, but without a conversation and with the aim of obtaining answers that can be quickly *processed*. They are techniques that make researchers focus on their *own* production process, and force them into a professional perspective. Researchers who want to get things moving and still use questionnaires

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or standard interviews run the risk of ending up with truth-finding. What they want and how they do it are in that case incongruous.

With this method a much better approach is where you as a researcher get someone to talk about a number of topics (Kvale, 1996). It is not about getting people to give a precise answer to a question, but about them telling stories. You can encourage them to start by asking questions, commenting, but also by using photos, examples and suchlike. If the researcher/pacesetter records the conversation (e.g. by making a report or a transcript of a recording) and gives it back, this is not only for verification but precisely to elicit *even more* story. This is especially recommended when people have to delve into their own memories. In the second instance people often add essential matters. You can also use this to bring the conversation to a more reflective level: together with the discussion partner you can make a link to the various *logics* that are at work. This way you can encourage in-depth learning in individuals in a second round of recording stories or making stories.

Research is Encouraging Learning

This brings us to an important aspect of 'doing research': in conversations you not only gather data (*sense-taking*) but also consciously or unconsciously exchange meanings (*sense-making*) that have effects on the interviewed persons and others in the organisation, which you must be prepared for in a subsequent phase up to and including the phase of diffusion of the product. By asking questions the pacesetter induces learning.

This means that before they get into contact with people, researchers have to ask themselves what they are going to do with the stories they elicit and what they (want to) realise with them. Are they going to 'summarise' them? Do they want to feed the story back to generate even more story? Do they want to use passages to include in a text? Do they just want to show a compilation of how several people talked about an episode? In other words, process, medium and form from *later* determine in part how the researcher sets up the earlier phase.

We can formulate this as a more general *rule*: researchers would do well to continually break away from their own production process and ask themselves how the process of the other person fits together and will develop as a result of contact with the researcher. Case 3 shows us the most extreme form: the archetype Marlene functions as an attractor in the process development of the other, and embodies the *noticeable result* to be realised.

Continuing Reflection

From the discussion of the cases we deduce that we should think far less in terms of 'research' and more in terms of safeguarding 'space'. We must set up that space so that participants are prompted to get moving via the path of reflection. How you achieve that, and when you shouldn't, requires continuing research and openly giving an account of success and failure. As far as we are concerned that is one of the major agenda items for further development. Only by working with this method through learning and reflecting can we prevent this method from degenerating into a hype. Research into counter-indications for the use of this method is certainly part of that. We can partly deduce these from what we have discussed here: the method is not going to work if the space for

multi-voicing cannot be gained, but also if traumatic issues have occurred or there are matters that cannot bear the light of day. However, our experience shows that the method has more possibilities than we might imagine at first sight (see Smid & Busato, 2006).

4. CONCLUSION

The question in this chapter was how, as a professional or manager, you can succeed with the learning history method. To that end we investigated some experiences using this method. What moves did we make? In our discussion we started with a school of thought (Roth and Kleiner) that is based on being in the 'here-and-now' and being able to learn from the 'in those days', the 'there-and-then'. With a product, a learning history in the shape of a text based on this starting principle, a professional or manager can more or less record a piece of the past. That puts the organisation a step further than trial-and-error learning. After this we moved further ahead. We came to a mode of thought that indicates that 'here-and-now' is always already past and that you can learn in the 'there and then', from the 'in those days'. We go from a methodical process of production of a learning text to a process of the co-production of continuing learning processes. Besides other objects, texts can play a part here, with process steering and *real-time* giving of meaning to the fore. To keep up the pace in the learning, pacesetters have to break free of their own process and remain very closely involved with the people who are moving (or going to move). The pacesetter directs the learning. Reverting to the 'in those days' remains important, but a pacesetter or *régisseur* only reverts to the past from a future orientation!

This shift has major consequences for the choice of work form, the transitional objects, and for the positioning and competencies of the consultant or manager.

Keeping a permanent process of investigative learning and 'exploration' going is not something that's taken for granted in many organisations. It requires a lot of inventiveness to manage that. How a pacesetter sets up this process depends to a great extent on the habits that have developed in everyday practice. In choosing a form the pacesetter must retain the connection with what is customary, but on the other hand also go a little beyond the expectation horizon of people so as to surprise them, put them slightly on the wrong foot, get them out of their routine. The methodological rule that applies here is as follows:

> *the interaction in the exploration is not a reversal or denial, but contains references to the interaction in the everyday work process and at the same time has its own quality.*

Working like an automaton in small groups is not sensible; they become isolated islands. The real art is and remains refraining from being judgemental.

Actually, a similar rule applies to the transitional objects that can play a part in this kind of process: the objects that facilitate exploration are not a denial or reversal, but contain references to the interaction in the everyday and at the same time have their own quality.

Whoever stimulates learning as a pacesetting professional or manager does not stay remote but becomes an active player. They will inevitably come across the power problem and will also meet resistance. They will have to be able to endure quite a lot and will have to be able to switch between empathy and connectedness to inquiry processes on the one

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side, and on the other side hard, unrelenting but affectionate defence of the *conversation room*. And that can be paradoxical, just as paradoxical as the image of the campfire. However nice it is to linger by the fire, it will also attract wild animals in the dark, against which one has to create a defence.

NOTES

1. We include *investigative* and/or expansive learning in 'deep learning'. That is distinct from less deep or surface-level learning (conditioning, imitating, trial-and-error learning) (see Engeström, 1995; Smid & Beckett, 2004).
2. And there is good reason for that. The well-known organisational scientist Pettigrew (2003) makes thinking about organisational learning dynamic. He talks about *strategy-in-flight*, for over time the policy process, the formulation of policy, implementation and evaluation are no longer distinguishable from each other, occur simultaneously, in the middle of what he calls *power and politics*. He turns the spotlight on places 'lower' down the organisations where 'players' are creating new realities, but emphasises the great pace and also gives attention to the power processes and political behaviour.
3. In principle the idea of a feedforward loop is estimating how a system will function in the future, so that we can make corrections now on the basis of those estimations.
4. Case Liesbeth Halbertsma.
5. Case Tonnie van der Zouwen.
6. Case Vittorio Busato.
7. We also see the emphasis on passion and emotion in the Unilever case. See Mirvis, Ayas & Roth (2001; 2003). They make it clear that the top man himself has to play a key role to show that managers in change processes are also only people!
8. 'With no continuity, there is no learning' (Weick, 2001, pp. 207ff).

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